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VIOLENT CONFLICT AND YOUTH LIVELIHOODS SECURITY IN BOR TOWN, JONGLEI STATE, SOUTH SUDAN

Authors: ¹Gatkuoth Lok Gatwich Diet, ²Reginald Nalugala and ³Ann Ng'endo Ndung'u
^{1,2&3}The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, P.O BOX 62157 00200, Nairobi, Kenya.

Website: www.cuea.edu

Corresponding author: Gatkuoth Lok Gatwich Diet, Email: glokgatwich@gmail.com

Chief Editor

Web:
www.ijsdc.org
Email:
info@ijsdc.org

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Abstract: *The overall objective of this study was to establish the effects of violent conflict on the youths' livelihoods security in Bor town. The specific objectives were to: identify conflict drivers among the youth; assess conflict effects relative to youth productive activities; and establish the link between conflicts and economic exclusion of the youth in Bor. The research method applied was descriptive survey, and mixed method approach. The target population was 262 youth however: only 187 responded to the survey. Data from questionnaires was analysed using descriptive statistics and presented in frequencies and percentages using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version) as well as narrative for qualitative data. From the first objective the study found out that violent conflict in Bor is caused by; favouritism, marginalisation, political supremacy, foreign interference, fighting militias, economic hardships, tribalism, power struggle and lack of good management of resources. The second objective found out that 89% of the respondents cited that internal conflicts have affected the state while 11% did not. Looking at ways in which the state has been affected, 52.7% stated foreign interference contributed to internal conflicts, 47.4% militias were a cause of internal conflict and 41.1% felt tribalism was a cause of internal conflicts. 67% of the respondents noted that the youth were involved in positive inclination towards violent conflict whereas 33% were not involved. More so 69% of the respondents noted that most of the youth in Bor were very highly involved in violent conflict, 20% were highly involved whereas 8% were very lowly involved. Majority of the respondents, 85% noted that the government never helped in eradicating acts of violent conflict in Bor whereas 15% felt that the government helped in eradicating acts of violent conflict. In finding out further how the government helped, 16% stated it offered youth education 84 negated it, 8% stated it had offered positive youth development whereas 92% denied it and 3% it funded youth projects while 97% said the reverse 2% felt it offered appropriate advice and 98% said no support to the youth. Therefore; violent conflict in Jonglei state is closely linked to the prevailing security vacuum in rural area and the quest for cattle raids and child abduction. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan and the peace agreement signatories in line with their existing commitments, should support the inclusion of a people-centred goals on peace, governance and justice in a development framework. The proposed targets aimed at addressing drivers of violence, conflict and insecurity should be consolidated and improved through consultation with civil society. Lastly, there should be increased accountability of regional multilateral institutions and national government through transparent systems, which measure and monitor forms of violence and conflict, rule of law and access to justice, governance and security provision using harmonized indicators.*

Key words: *Violent conflict, youth, resources*

1.1 Study background

UNDP (2018) shows that violent conflict continues to be a persistent security concern in many parts of the world. One of the reasons has been the growing number of youth world over who have no fulfilling jobs and still move to urban centres in search for better life and has not only remained an undeniable cause to human insecurity, but also undoubted obstacle to development actualization. Globally, Ebata, Izzi, Lenton, and Samson (2006) stated that young people/youth are not only prospective threat to security, but also their rising number together with joblessness; urbanization among other factors can lead to aggression. In this regard, all groups who fight for the aforesaid reasons and various others lose a lot of lives, properties as well as obstruct development.

For youth in Jonglei state, their sense of social worth and identity depends on success in executing their role as keeper of cattle and community protector, which also entails participation in intercommunal feuds and conflicts, and even largescale revenge attacks (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013: p.6). Youth and their communities at large consider participation in such violence as legitimate and moral (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2013). Mercy Corps (2014) emphasises that pressure by elders, politicians or family on youths in South Sudan to defend against outside aggression or become aggressors themselves will continue in the foreseeable future and that while dangerous, these violent acts are calculated choices by young people to improve their chances of survival, social status and communal influence.

Some young men have joined the rebellion in search of financial rewards, and South Sudan's dire economic situation may well have fed this dynamic, increasing the movement of Western Equatorians from rural areas to towns in search of livelihood opportunities, spurring criminal activity and increasing the attractiveness of armed rebellion (Schomerus and Taban in Saferworld, 2017). Versions of male courage in Africa are socially constructed, fluid over time and in different settings, and plural; there is no such thing as a "typical" young man in sub-Saharan Africa. However, a common key requirement to attaining manhood in Africa is achieving some level of financial independence, employment or income, and subsequently starting a family (Barker and Ricardo, 2005). Barker and Ricardo (2005) also highlight that older men "have a role in holding power over younger men and thus in defining manhood in Africa". Rites of passage are important factors in the socialisation of boys and men throughout the region. This is also true of South Sudan. Barker and Ricardo (2005) find that young men who do not achieve a sense of socially respected manhood may be more likely to engage in violence.

Porter (2013) highlights that post-conflict contexts are marked by norms of masculinity that are extremely negative: highly rigid, militaristic, and associated with violence, toughness, the objectification of women, and repression of all emotions other than anger. Men who have been members of (informal) armed groups are often heavily influenced by these norms even after conflicts have ended (Porter, 2013). Gender norms are also implicated in the practice of cattle raiding; owning a gun and participating in a cattle raid are rites of passage for adolescent boys, and for men these are symbols of manhood and virility which confer social status (Saferworld, 2014). Recruitment into the SPLA or non-state armed groups is closely linked with militarised notions of masculinity, and can provide a sense of identity and self-worth which would otherwise be difficult to find (Saferworld, 2014).

Oosterom (2017) points out that war and violent conflict are often associated with producing “militarised masculinities”, but that these are not simply reproduced by the behaviours of ex-combatant males. Notions of masculinity are negotiated and reproduced in local institutions and everyday social interactions, by both men and women (Oosterom, 2017). In Oosterom’s study of gendered insecurity and agency among the Latuko, one of the Equatorian ethnic minorities living in Imatong state, it became clear that, in light of ongoing insecurity in South Sudan since the end of the civil war, (non-combatant) women actively seek to influence hybrid governance institutions but also reproduce the masculinities within the Amangat (a village-level decision making body of adult males) (Oosterom, 2017). Search for Common Ground (2016) highlight research which indicates that women in South Sudan are just as likely as men to believe violence is a valid way to solve conflicts, this is important as they influence attitudes and behaviour in informal social spaces like the home. Pendle (2015) highlights how “local popular discourse and bull songs often honoured militarised acts of the youth and referenced the bravery of the titweng. Women discussed their pride in sons who were part of the titweng and described methods used from an early age, such as storytelling, to foster in their sons a responsibility to participate in community defence”. Highlighting the role of women in sometimes encouraging violence among young men and reinforcing the association between masculinity and cattle raiding.

It appears that politicians in South Sudan are increasingly capable of mobilising their youth base to settle political scores (Mercy Corps. 2014). Mercy Corps (2014) states that “Youth seeking to establish their social and financial independence and influence, yet struggling under the burden of a lack of education, relevant and marketable skills, and scarce work opportunities to apply those skills, are prime targets for politicians searching for foot soldiers to carry out their battles to gain political influence”. Military commanders also have language and terminology to mobilize young cattle keepers by associating fighting with moral justice and community protection and rights. Military commanders are also known to establish military loyalty by contributing to the bridewealth of their soldiers, who have in many cases lost all their cattle and are unable to marry (Danish Refugee Council, 2017). Raleigh et al (2016) point out that in South Sudan the presence of armed youth militias (especially the Dinka) is not simply just “a product of local disputes, but rather the effect of government forces arming cattle herders as a method of creating proxy fighters to ally against any existing opposition forces, as well as ensuring that new opposition is not created (by keeping local communities content and feeling able to defend themselves)”.

Barker and Ricardo (2005) found that in some settings, young men’s participation in conflict and use of violence become ways to obtain empowerment, or essentially a means to achieving and wielding power, for young men who perceive no other way to achieve it. There may also be a sense of camaraderie with male peers for young men in some armed insurgency groups, and in some cases, male role models or surrogate fathers, and substitute families (Barker and Ricardo, 2005).

1.2 Statement of the problem

Enough studies have been conducted in Jonglei state by both Government & humanitarian organisations on civil war and communal conflicts, however; it has hardly shown a research

conducted about violent conflict impacts on youth livelihoods security in Bor, Jonglei state. The Independence of South Sudan, 2011, gave South Sudanese citizens new hopes. It provided them with a chance to rebuild the war-torn country and improve livelihoods of poor households through the use of natural resources. Despite this highly celebrated independence and anticipated wealth creation, violent conflicts in Jonglei state have severely increased and not stopped. Besides; poverty levels have increased to 69.6% (UNDP, 2016). Therefore; this study explores the extent to which violent conflict affects the youth livelihoods security in Bor, Jonglei state.

1.3 Research Objectives


The overall objective is to establish the effect of violent conflict on the youth livelihoods security in Bor, Jonglei State. Beneath are specific objectives as follows.

- a) To identify conflict drivers among the youth in Jonglei state;
- b) To assess conflict effects relative to youth productive activities;
- c) To establish the link between conflicts and economic exclusion of Jonglei youth;

1.4 Justification of the Study

In South Sudan violent conflict situation youth and the adolescents bear the yoke. As a consequence they suffer a lot and they do not deserve this at all. Hence they should be educated on how dangerous and none productive is such an engagement. Majority of youth have got no chance to complete school and so they need to be sensitized so as to abstain from joining any fighting forces. Further, youth are also highly involved in cattle rustling and homicide as such they should know the danger of this activity for it leads to loss of lives and loss of properties. As a matter of fact most victims are the youth themselves. Important undertaking to this study and understand is how these young people perceive their living conditions and how they think the conflict has affected their co-existence with other communities and the general wellbeing of Jonglei state. The study is carried out to set a strong foundation for youth advocacy and to provide alternative strategies for the youth general wellbeing.

1.5 Conceptual Framework



Source: Own conceptualization, 2019

1.6 Literature review

Theoretical review

The conflict theory guided this study for it best pictures the continual conflict in any social setting. Turner (1975) observed that the father of social conflict Karl Marx classified people into the haves and the have-nots. These two categories are mutually dependent upon one another. And they have an asymmetrical and not symmetrical relationship in which the haves have the upper hand and are able to accumulate wealth through the have nots' labour power. Whereas the have-nots have no other options only to concede to selling their labour power in order to earn a living. This class struggle synthesizes into a socialist society based on Marx's tenet. In reality every human being or group has goals towards some better living that can cause contradictions between individuals in a given society. As a matter of fact this proves that these goals are totally incompatible with other individuals' and groups' goals. This means a form of inhibition may ensue, which causes frustration. In the quest for survival basic needs may be repressed and this leads to aggression and hatred. This hatred transforms to obvious verbal or physical violence with the intention to hurt. Eventually a cycle of counter-violence for defence and revenge ensues (Galtung, 2000).

There is perpetual effort to realize one's goals, which leads to conflicts. One major class of sources of frustration is the scarcity of resources even with endless effort to mobilize the resources. Inability to afford something produces frustration and intentions to negate the source of inhibition even with violence, since it is an outward source of frustration (Lukin, 2007; Galtung, 1973). When conflict erupts there is inevitable inequality in resource distribution. This is a recipe for violent conflict, should the state be rich, powerful and governing poor citizens who are powerless and living in misery. It is also a breeding ground for violence when the inhabitants are not free and

incapable of determining their own conditions. There is a significant correlation between what happens at state and at other levels for satisfaction of human needs and logical implication for violence either symmetric or asymmetric conflicts (Staleno, 2014; Evans, 2013).

In situations where one is unable to achieve set goals because they are blocked for lack of mobilized resources or due to their incompatibility with others goals, this in itself causes conflicts. Pragmatically, conflict as a special case of frustration may happen back and forth (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011; Galtung, 2000).

In this study, conflict theory is relevant in that, it explains how differences in thought, preferences and goals of groups cause misunderstanding and conflict. In Jonglei State, different communities have different intentions and goals for themselves. This has led to hatred and intentions to hurt neighbouring communities so as to benefit from their possessions. Dinka have divergent political aspirations in relation to the Nuer. The Murle also have different views of their relationship with their neighbours. Such intentions cause violence between communities.

1.7 Empirical review

Doulton et al (2005) observed that young people make up almost a fifth of the world's population. Close to 85 per cent of the 1.061 billion young men and women between 15 and 24 years live in developing countries. Asia accounts for 60 per cent of the total, another 15 per cent live in Africa as approximately 10 per cent reside in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to Gupta et al (2014), young people matter in that an unmatched 1.8 billion youth are alive today. Hence they matter a lot because they have inherent human rights that must be fulfilled. Doulton et al (2005) noted that the remaining 15 per cent of youth live in developed countries and are doing well in life and that they grow up in cohesive, caring societies that prepare them for a responsible and productive existence. Today's youth are better educated than ever before having acquired unprecedented levels of knowledge of the world around them.

Young people are often overlooked. This trend needs an urgent correction since it jeopardizes youth and the economies at large (Gupta et al, 2014). Daiute, Beykont, Higson-Smith and Nucci (2006), assessed the rationale why youth fight and exclude each other from social groups or participate in armed conflicts and note that educators, scholars and clinicians who study issues typically focus on behaviour, maturation and personality of individual youth rather than the roles they play in their societies. Youth conflict is a developmental process of youth in societies with problems of political instability, unequal access to material resources and injustice. Case studies show children in armed conflict in Mozambique, APBOLA, the Philippines and Nigeria, young people go in to post war tensions in Bosnia, Croatia and South Africa, Arab and Jewish youth in the Middle East crisis among others. These examples show an in-depth examination of youth conflict as a social practice entrenched in local, national and international processes.

According to Mac-ikemenjima (2008), youth face great risks in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict processes. They are more likely to be recruited into fighting forces, become victims of sexual violence, lack reproductive health care, contract HIV, be head households and miss education opportunities. However; young people are also the greatest resource towards reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction. This is more so since they are innovative, energetic and enthusiastic. It is therefore imperative to massively invest in youth development in post conflict settings in order to prevent reoccurrence of crisis and to ensure that their energies are

channelled towards sustainable development. Ebata, Izzi, Lenton, and Samson (2006) posits that young people face very many obstacles in their transition from childhood to adulthood in many parts of the world. These include access to education, unemployment and the HIV/AIDS. They grow up in conflict situations which negatively impact on all dimensions of their lives. Feelings of exclusion can cause emergence of violent groups and violence. Young people are often seen as a source of problems while their potential to act as agents of change towards peace and development remain indispensable (Ebata, Izzi, Lenton and Sampson, 2006).

Douma (2006) observed that in Sub Saharan Africa political exclusion of certain communities leads to violent conflict and that rights deprivation of specific ethnic groups from political decision making is another recipe for violent conflicts in the continent as well as lack of political dialogue between antagonistic elite groups in due course leads to some sort of violent resistance against a given state.

This study sought to find out the causes of violent conflict in Jonglei state of the Republic of South Sudan. In this endeavour the young people in Bor who are from the Naath (Nuer), Jieng(Dinka) and the Murle people constituted the unit under investigation. With this in mind violent conflicts in any context have got various causes. These causes may be political, social, economic, communal and environmental in nature. And according to the UN (2017), in developing countries such as the Republic of South Sudan conflict drivers are principally ethno-political or inter-communal in essence between and among existing different nationalities in Jonglei state. The violent conflict drivers in South Sudan's Jonglei state have no much difference with the causes of conflicts occurring in other parts of the country as well as of the world. Unlike other young people in other parts of the country, Jonglei young people have organized themselves into fighting forces for obvious reasons. South Sudan is culturally, socially, economically, politically, ecologically and spiritually diverse. The literature suggests that there are multiple motivations for youth livelihood choices, including engagement in violent conflict, and these need to be understood in relation to their specific contexts (Walton, 2010). It is difficult to capture all the choices and motivations behind these decisions, and with the limited time available for this review the findings are not exhaustive. Local context is also key to a discussion of actors and channels of communication trusted by youth in South Sudan. There is evidence that engagement with youth, as well as levels of trust by youth in various actors, varies in different communities. The most recent outbreak of violence, and continuing volatility on the ground, has, however, impacted on the availability of up-to-date information for several areas.

Looked at closely, local people in South Sudan and Jonglei state particular have many explanations for the inter-communal fights notably; (a) that violence is an outcome of southern Sudan's secession from the Sudan for the local people believe that South Sudanese people found no common enemy against which they could collectively confront together, (b) ethnic groups have constantly fought and killed one another however the brutality and severity of present assaults is a consequence of a change from traditional weapons to contemporary military weapons,(c) exaggerated bride-wealth, cattle raids and associated domestic violence have augmented considerably from the time of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and last and not the least of all, (d) sterility amongst the Murle people has caused child abductions and interrelated local violence (Rolandsen and Breidlid, 2012). These factors have commonly been told as the rationales behind conflicts occurrences. Lacey (2013) observed that from 2009,

thousands of women got abducted in Jonglei state's castigatory raids between the Nuer Lou youth and Murle youth. In such violent killings women became the target though. This was unusual for vulnerable people as women to get killed. But in this situation killing women was almost seen as normal. Moreover, women were also abducted as lawful spoils of war together with livestock and other chattels by Jonglei fighting youth.

Research on conflicts in Africa has also focused on issues of youth exclusion and marginalization. The influential work of Richards et al. (2005) stated that the conflict in Africa is the manifestation of a crisis of exclusion of youth who are alienated and lack opportunities. Manning (2009), Richards et al. (2005), and Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) assert that youth exclusion and the weakening of agrarian social structures fuel civil wars in Africa, where intergenerational tensions and resentment to patrimonial institutions and authority push young people into rebel groups.

It has increasingly been emphasized that it is not one factor alone, but rather a combination of factors, that drive youth to violence. The nexus of economic, social, and political exclusion, along with other factors, create conditions where young people are more likely to resort to violence or join gangs or rebel groups. Greene (1993) and Kramer (2000) discuss inequality, exposure to violence, poverty, and social exclusion as predicting factors for youth violence in the United States. Shildrick and MacDonald (2008) stress that social capital, economic marginalization, and exclusion shape youth experience with violence in non-fragile contexts. Stewart (2008) stated that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political inequalities, the chances of violence increase. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) stressed that grievances, poverty, and economic deprivation, low levels of education, personal experience with violence, social marginalization, and political alienation, as well as rebel group recruitment tactics, served as strong predictors for whether young people were likely to join rebel groups in West Africa. Low levels of community and family acceptance also tend to be associated with violent behaviour of youth (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Urdal and Hoelscher (2009) pointed to links between levels of formal and informal education, economic conditions and development. In mapping of programs aimed at reintegrating youth ex-combatants, frustration at lack of livelihood opportunities has been found to have played a part in motivating youth violence (Walton, 2010).

Young people are particularly vulnerable to exclusion in all of its forms. In terms of development, youth are particularly prone to feeling isolated and separated, and may be less adept at recognizing or addressing such feelings. In her 2010 analysis of the dynamics between youth, gender, and fragility, Sabine Kurtenbach notes two forms of societal-level exclusion that may have the most significant effects on youth development: access to education and work, and acceptance from elders. In fact, youth often cite exclusion as the source of their discontent (Abbink and van Kessel 2005). Analysing evidence collected from Africa's agro-pastoral societies, Kurtenbach also found that such exclusion was often based upon age and social status; that is, their problems stemmed from "generational opposition." This is a significant issue for West African youth: a number of recent studies indicated that youth continue to have very limited voice in their communities and are often treated as a category of exclusion. Youth sometimes express anger and frustration over their marginalized position and limited participation in decision-making processes, that is, traditional practices that limit their engagement in community life or employment opportunities (Ginifer, 2003). Many also express a lack of trust in elders and in institutional structures (Dale 2008; Dale et al. 2010).

Carl Marx, an 18th century sociologist, was one of the original theorists to develop a conflict perspective on how society functions (Holmes et al, 2007). This perspective is mostly concerned with Marx's deep structures of unseen power within the capitalist system (Walters and Crook, 1995). The central areas of focus from this perspective are; (1) the classes that exist in society, (2) inequalities of society and (3) how society functions to serve the powerful class and disadvantage the others, thereby causing conflict (Holmes et al, 2007; Haralambos and Holborn 1991). Examples of these conflicts include wars, revolutions, strikes and communism (McGregor, 2000).

According to the theory of conflict by Marx, power is present in each individual and in every relationship. It is defined as the ability of a group to get another group to take some form of desired action, usually by consensual power and sometimes by force (Holmes, Hughes and Julian, 2007). In society governments, organisations and an elite class of people make decisions that affect the lives of a large mass of other people. A significant amount of research shows these decisions are often made to serve their own economic interests and values of which includes the means of production and property ownership (Holmes et al, 2007; Walters and Crook, 1995; Haralambos and Holborn, 1990; McGregor, 2000). These decisions cause inequality in society and resentment from people who are excluded from the decision making process. The unequalness of this decision-making and power allocation enables the fortunate to enforce their will on the less fortunate (Graetz, 2001, Walters and Crook, 1995). It's due to the power that has been taken by force from the people that has caused the conflict that is seen South Sudan. There is a gap on how power should be used to benefit the local community which in return will be desist from violence and engage themselves constructively.

1.8 Methodology

The study applied descriptive survey, and mixed method approach. Jonglei is a state of South Sudan. It is comprised of 11 counties namely; Ayod, Fangak, Pigi, Uror, Nyirol, Akobo, Duk, Twic, Bor, Pachella, and Pibor County. Jonglei state has an area of about 122,479 km². And it is the biggest and most densely inhabited of the country's ten states. Based on 2008 census, Jonglei population is 1,873,176 people in its aforesaid 11 counties. The state faces challenges such as low human capacities, poor infrastructure as well as low trade volumes. Besides; intermittent violent clashes among Nationalities such as Dinka, Nuer and Murle persist to date. These Nationalities of Jonglei are mainly Nilotic agro-pastoralists. The UN estimated in May 2012 that conflict in Jonglei state had affected the lives of over 140,000 people, and has been heavily influenced by the broader South Sudanese conflict since December 2013. The target population comprised the youth within Bor County with basic English Literacy youth constituting 2613 of them. These are the English literate youth as per the Jonglei State Statistics office.

Table 1: Target population

Tribe	Population
Nuer	1470
Dinka	474
Murle	267
Other	402
Total	2613

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 2: Sample of the ethnic groups members

Tribe	Population
Nuer	147
Dinka	47
Murle	27
Other	40
Total	261

Source: Jonglei State Statistics Office, 2018.

The target population was 262 youth however: only 187 responded to the survey. Quantitative data from questionnaires was analysed using descriptive statistics and presented in frequencies and percentages using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 22). Qualitative data was coded and summarized through narration.

1.9 Findings and discussion

Table 3: Distribution of Respondent by Age


Age Bracket	Frequency	Percentage
14 – 25 years	12	45.83
26 – 30 years	9	35.42
31 – 35 years	4	18.75
Total	25	100.00

Source: Research Findings (2019).

The findings of the study indicated that 45.83% of the respondents were aged between 14 – 25 years, 35.42% were aged between 26 – 30 years, and 18.75% were aged between 31 – 35 years.

Respondents' Religion

The study sought to find out the respondents' religion. The findings are presented below in figure 2.

**Figure 1: Respondents' Religion**

Source: Research findings (2019)

From the figure above, 46% of the respondents were indigenous believers, 35% were Catholics, 15% were Protestants and 4% were Muslims. This follows that most of the residents in Bor are Christians.

Respondents Occupation

The study sought to find out the respondents occupation. The findings are represented below in figure 3.




Figure 2: Respondents Occupation

Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure, 48% of the respondents have no employment, 36% are business owners, 11% are employed and 5% are students. This implies that the many of the youth in Bor are jobless hence they easily engage in violent activities in order for them to voice their disappointments.

Respondents' level of education

The respondents were requested to indicate their level of education. The findings were as shown in the table 4 below.

Table 4: Distribution by level of education

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent
None	1	5.5
Primary	10	40.4
Secondary	5	21.0
Tertiary	7	24.8
University	2	7.3
Total	25	100.0

Source: Research Findings (2019)

As reflected in the table 4, more than (40.4%), of the respondents had attended up to primary school level (24.8%) were tertiary level holders, (21.0%) had attended up to secondary school level, (7.3%) had attained up to university level and only (5.5%) had not.

Living in the community

The respondents were asked to indicate whether they enjoy living in the community. The results are shown below.




Figure 4: Enjoy living in their community

Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure, 57% of the respondents enjoy living in their community while 43% do not. This implies that those who don't enjoy living in their community it's because they are not happy with it's because they are not happy with the current insecurity and conflict within the community. The study further wanted to know how the respondents spend their free time.

Conflict drivers amongst the youth

This first objective sought to establish the causes of violent conflict amongst the youth of Jonglei state in the Republic of South Sudan. The data was obtained through key informant interviews and the subsequent results are presented in the succeeding paragraphs in prose. Back in the literature review, Gordon (2014) states that violent conflict in Jonglei state like in other parts of the country is undoubtedly caused by past and existing perceptions of favouritism and marginalization between and amongst Jonglei nationalities. In the findings respondents agreed that Conflict drivers in Jonglei state are many and one of them is political supremacy, which is the source of favouritism and subsequently propelled marginalisation among Jonglei communities.

The respondents made a lot of mention with respect to Foreign interference where organizations with foreign workers have never been neutral this because everyone among them brings in preferred models, relationships, motivations and historical understandings in dealing with South Sudan challenges facing the government as well as the local leaders and communities and this cemented Gordon (2014). The respondents stated that fighting between militia groups and ethnic tensions caused by political wrangling between and among political leaders in the state proved to be causes of conflict in Jonglei state. This holds true according to Arnold and Alden (2007) who observed that the indisputable conflict drivers in Jonglei state are economic hardships and insecurity both of which brought about White Army factor and this White Army entity came into existence to boost economic incomes and improve local defence since there has never been a government in place prior to South Sudan Independence.

The manifestation of this is shown in the succeeding respondents interviews in which the Nuer, Dinka and Murle Communities of Jonglei state have been observed to have been in perpetual social

strife in terms of fighting between themselves because of tribalism. One of the respondent observed that 'The Nuer people have been fighting the Dinka people because of tribalism, which is radically applied by Dinka people in Jonglei state's political interplay. Likewise the Murle people fight against Dinka simply because Dinka dominate all the state instructions'. Causes of violent conflict in Jonglei includes, but not limited to lack of proper management of resources and the power struggle among state political leaders.

Power struggle, at the national level between President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Dr. Riek Machar has influenced and caused division between people in Jonglei. The current civil war in the Republic of South Sudan is more than years old and a negotiated resolution to the conflict seems more elusive with the passage of time. There are various challenges to the peace process however, the most immediate challenge has been the chronic failure to address the root cause of the conflict. In November 2013, President Salva Kiir – from the Dinka ethnic group – dismissed his then vice-president Riek Machar – from the Nuer group – and his all cabinet. The dismissal followed Kiir's decision to replace members of the army and government following rumours of a possible coup.

Rolandsen and Breidlid, (2012) noted that, there is a belief that violence is an outcome of southern Sudan's secession from the Sudan has not been found true. Likewise the erroneous perception that local people believe that South Sudanese people found no common enemy against which they could collectively confront together, has become negative. The justification that ethnic groups have constantly fought and killed one another however; the brutality and severity of present assaults is a consequence of a change from traditional weapons to contemporary military weapons has not been proven nor wrong.

Respondents stated that one of the causes is dissolution of the SPLM by President Kiir which sparked an outrage in all the main organs of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). They added that tensions further escalated when Kiir accused Machar of plotting a coup in December 2013, which Machar denied as a mere ploy for president Kiir to crack down his political opponents. According the respondents the accusations sparked violence in the country, where factions loyal to either Kiir or Machar engaged in fighting. Ethnic-related violence started also to spread with militia groups carrying out attacks in villages and areas known to be inhabited by either Dinka or Nuer. The findings indicate that South Sudan has gone through bad governance for a prolonged period of time, it is also a land-locked country and that another problem is of weak institutions in the state. The latter is actually the biggest problem because weak institutions sometimes manifest themselves in forms of crisis.

Rolandsen and Breidlid (2012) stated that inter-communal conflicts in the state of Jonglei have oftentimes been caused by the issues of grazing land, water and cattle. The year 2009, was significantly known for a radical shift from cattle rustling and fights between armed youth in cattle camps to targeting of vulnerable groups including children, women and elderly people in their rural areas. The respondents have confirmed in the literature that issues to do with grazing lands and water points have been causes to Jonglei violent conflict amongst young people and not only that respondents have proved it right that the increase of attacking vulnerable groups in the inter-communal attacks and the counter-intercommunal-attacks in which women, children, elderly, and invalids fall prey in such violent engagements.

In a nutshell, violent conflict in Jonglei state, Bor, South Sudan is caused by ignorance and low literacy rates, which are big factors among the four ethnic communities, and not only common high rate of unemployment among the youth and a lack of social and economic development in the eleven involved counties; poverty, tribal dominance and clan jealousy, lack of strong political awareness, civic education and nationalism, fragile political and social institutions, factors of war, trauma and wounds, lust for cattle which leads to raiding, lack of organized grass grazing areas for pasture, and lack of development in terms of infrastructure in the states, e.g feeder roads constituted the driving force behind this perpetual violence.

Effects of internal conflicts in Jonglei state

The study sought to know whether the internal conflicts in Jonglei have affected the state. The results are shown below.




Figure 3: Effects of internal conflict in Jonglei to the state

Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure, 89% of the respondents noted that internal conflicts in Jonglei have affected the state while 11% noted that it has not. This implies that conflict has a huge effect in the development of Jonglei state. The effects of violent conflict in Jonglei and South Sudan as a whole proved to be very severe. It damaged more than four hundred thousand South Sudanese lives. This crisis is continuing to fill South Sudan communities with psychologically incapacitated soldiers, wounded child soldiers, widows and orphans who still needed rehabilitation to make them work and live normally in their society. The conflict has driven millions of people out of their villages and consequentially prevented them from their daily activities from which they earn their living such as running business, cattle keeping and cultivation. This necessitated migration of the villages to towns or else they will be killed or starved to death. This plight resulted to movement of refugees known as internally displaced persons to concentration camps where they find insufficient food, water, education in emergency and less medicine. It leaves us deeply dependent on dubious foreign aid

The conflict has spiralled into tribal conflicts, causing constant break up of tribal links which keep the state together. These tribal sentiments caused tribal hates, which made it hard to find the way of reconciliation. The conflict has caused close down of some institutions of learning such as primary schools, secondary schools and universities preventing students from pursuing their studies. This in turn increases the prevailing adult illiteracy which made it impossible to create new intellectual and skilled groups of managers, entrepreneurs, administrators in the future to get closer to most of developing African countries and to the Western and Eastern world.

The conflict has already led to not operating some of oil fields in Jonglei state. It also stopped explorations of oil, minerals and other valuable resources in many areas of the state and this is an absolute disadvantage to economy that depends entirely on the oil revenues at least for now. Moreover, 8- such insecurity scared away investors across the country which will continue to hamper youth livelihoods security in Jonglei vast areas. Normal relationship between Jonglei Nationalities got affected. The conflict already prevented South Sudan from investing the necessary funds or energies in fighting against poverty and underdevelopment so long as the current conflict continues to draw men and skills and money.

Table 5: Causes of internal conflict in Jonglei to the state

Response	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total	Mean
Tribalism was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state	41.10%	29.80%	5.80%	10.80%	11.80%	100	1.974
Political supremacy has been a source of conflict among the Jonglei state political leaders	26.40%	34.90%	21.10%	10.00%	7.80%	100	3.167
Militias were a cause of internal conflict in South Sudan	47.40%	31.60%	9.50%	6.30%	5.30%	100	3.974
Foreign interference contributed to internal conflicts in Jonglei state, South Sudan	52.70%	20.00%	11.60%	5.30%	10.50%	100	3.225
Unemployment was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state	31.60%	19.10%	16.40%	10.00%	21.10%	100	3.887
Internal Conflicts affected the relationship between Nuer, Dinka and Murle communities	36.90%	36.80%	13.80%	7.30%	5.30%	100	3.846
Conflict resolution in Jonglei state has poorly been conducted	42.10%	15.80%	5.30%	26.30%	10.50%	100	3.696

Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the table, many of the respondents agreed that, political supremacy has been a source of conflict among the Jonglei state political leaders, militias were a cause of internal conflict in South Sudan, foreign interference contributed to internal conflicts in Jonglei state, South Sudan, unemployment was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state, internal Conflicts affected the relationship between Nuer, Dinka and Murle communities, and conflict resolution in Jonglei state has poorly been conducted. This is supported by means of 3.167, 3.974, 3.225, 3.887, 3.846 and 3.696 respectively. On the other hand some respondents disagreed that tribalism was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state, which is supported by the mean of 1.974. Political supremacy has been a source of conflict among the Jonglei state political leaders, militias were a cause of internal conflict in South Sudan, foreign interference contributed to internal conflicts in Jonglei state, South Sudan, unemployment was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state, internal Conflicts affected the relationship between Nuer, Dinka and Murle communities, and conflict resolution in Jonglei state has poorly been conducted.

The study sought to find out whether there are conflict effects to other states surrounding Jonglei. The results is presented below




Figure 4: Effects of internal conflicts in Jonglei state to the neighboring states
Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure above, 87% of the respondents noted that internal conflicts in Jonglei state has affected the other neighboring states while 13% indicated that it has not. From the findings it's evident that the internal conflicts in Jonglei state has affected the other neighbouring states. The findings further indicate that conflict in Jonglei has caused killings, forced migration, long-term refugee problems, and the destruction of infrastructure. Social, political, and economic institutions have been permanently damaged. The consequences of war, especially civil war, for development are profound. Conflicts are devastating since they affect both the supply of and demand for social services and health infrastructure. Violence increases the demand for many types of services. During conflict, regimes divert resources from health and social services to military expenditure and fighting itself destroys critical infrastructure such as hospitals and health centres, and the transportation network that brings people to these locations (Scott, Håvard, Mogleiv and Strand, 2015). Lack of opportunities: the biggest constraints to livelihood security for youth in urban areas in South Sudan are a lack of access to financial capital, education, relevant and marketable skills, and scarce work opportunities. Another issue has been the heavy reliance on foreign labour (both skilled and unskilled). Social norms: cultural expectations constrain the choice of jobs considered acceptable for boys and girls in South Sudan. Different backgrounds and aspirations: there was a crisis of expectation for young people after independence, who were expecting a “peace dividend” which did not materialize. There are differences in education levels and aspirations of returnee youth and those that remained in South Sudan during the civil war. Returnee youth also have views on education, repatriation and integration which often differ from those of their Sudan-born elders. There are also unrealistic views by some South Sudanese youth of their earning potential and viability as workers.

Rural vs urban: a number of factors influence the mobility of youth away from rural areas to urban areas. Pull factors include the hopes of generating an income, pursuing better education opportunities and the desire for a “modern” lifestyle. Push factors include low income levels, limited access to land. However, there is competition in the urban labour market from more educated returnee Sudanese and migrant workers. Young men from rural areas are also being pushed to Protection of Civilian sites to avoid ongoing recruitment into the conflict.

Social norms: are one way that violence “transmits” within groups. It has been argued that within conflict settings violence becomes a normalized way of life and survival. Exclusion, culture and family: inequalities between generations in South Sudan have grown rapidly over the past few decades; youth are largely excluded from formal political processes and continue to be subject to age-based systems of authority. Some have focused on the vulnerability of youth to capture by the military, and family roles and responsibilities as the primary consideration in the decisions taken by youth. Insecurity: much literature points to the issue of insecurity and lack of government ability to ensure security as a factor in local “youth” violence. With the eruption of violent conflict in 2013, different ethnic and youth militias emerged such as the White Army, Gelweng and others as a way of protecting their own communities when the state failed. Masculinity: a common requirement to attaining manhood in Africa is achieving some level of financial independence, employment, and subsequently starting a family; this can be interrupted in post-conflict situations, leaving young men in a state of limbo and making them more likely to engage in violence. Violent conflict is often associated with producing “militarized masculinities”; in South Sudan these are being reproduced by both men and women, reinforcing the association between masculinity and cattle raiding. Marriage dowries: increasing inability of male youth to meet rising dowry (bride price) demands, leading to many male youth enlisting in militias or joining cattle raids. Inequalities of power: Politicians and military leaders in South Sudan are increasingly capable of mobilizing their youth base to settle political scores. Young men’s participation in conflict can also become ways to obtain empowerment.

Conflict effect relative to youth productive activities

The study sought to find out the conflict effect relative to youth productive activities. The results are represented below. The study sought to know whether the youth in Bor, Jonglei State have a positive inclination towards violent conflict. The results are shown below.




Figure 5: Youth positive inclination towards violent conflict
Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure above, 67% of the respondents noted that the youth in Bor, Jonglei State have a positive inclination towards violent conflict while 33% indicated that the youths have no positive inclination towards violent conflict. This implies that, the majority of the youth in Jonglei were indulged more into conflict than anything else. This is in harmony with respondents’ views on whether involvement of young people in violent conflict is positive and worth dedicated for. (Deng, 2006) stated that no one among the child soldiers could consider him/herself vulnerable

prey, but rather a fighter for freedom. Even when confronted with the civil war trauma, one of the child soldiers thought it best to only attend military school for him to take vengeance for the dead comrades. The study further sought to find out other major effects resulting from youth involvement in violent conflict in Bor, Jonglei State. In chapter two exposure to violence generally also hurts those who participate in armed groups, as they have to overcome an education deficit, social stigma, and psychological distress that can leave them economically alienated and socially marginalised (Annan et al. 2011). At the country-level, this leads to what some call the 'conflict trap' (Hegre, Strand, Gates and Nygard, 2011).

The strongest predictor of civil war onset is whether a country has recently experienced civil war, with harmful 'neighbourhood effects' making surrounding countries similarly vulnerable to conflict spill over. However, vicious cycles of conflict that exacerbate poverty, slow economic growth, destabilise weak institutions and lead to violent relapse are not inevitable. The international response to post-conflict reconstruction can support a potential 'phoenix effect' of strengthened economic growth, where infrastructure development, debt relief and foreign aid, and currency stabilisation help to generate private investment (Kang and Meernik, 2005). In Bor Town, young people face many obstacles in their transition from childhood to adulthood; such obstacles are sometimes occasioned by conflicts. In many parts of the world, conflicts bring about lack of access to education, unemployment and the scourge of HIV/AIDS which exacerbates these difficulties.

Unemployment, urbanization as a result of civil war and other factors – can also lead to violence. As young people are growing in number and at the same time involve in fighting in this war torn Jonglei they are faced with fewer education opportunities, unemployment, the HIV/AIDS crisis, war and other forms of violence, which increased concern, even alarm, about 'youth' and the conditions that may encourage their participation in perpetuating violence and thus might prevent the consolidation of peace and development.

The respondents were asked to indicate the level of youth involvement in violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State. The results are shown in figure 8.




Figure 6: Level of youth involvement in violent conflict

Source: Research Findings (2018)

From the figure above, 69% of the respondents noted that most of the youth in Jonglei are very highly involved in violent conflict, 20% are highly involved, 8% are very lowly involved while

3% are lowly involved. The findings indicate that the higher percentage on the youth involvement in Jonglei violent conflict. The researcher set to find out the effects of violent conflict. The outcomes were discussed as below. In Marxist social conflict during social strife a lot of effects to the society emerge and conflict destroys and hinders development. It leads to poverty and hinders many young people from getting education (Hurst, 2000). Effects of violent conflict are in good number notably; violence during armed conflicts causes destruction and it limits market transactions. Public and private assets are destroyed, people are maimed or killed, and markets shrink as a result of higher transaction costs during violent conflict. In addition, people change their behaviour to survive amid violence. Thus, instead of maximizing profits, the population dedicates most of its effort on avoiding victimization and increasing their chance of survival. Both dynamics decrease the income of the people living in conflict, push some families into poverty and create poverty traps difficult to overcome. Violence destroys public and private assets, thereby decreasing the productive capacity of the firms, aggressions against the population erode human capital by killing and maiming as well as reducing school enrolment and deteriorating the health conditions of the population, violent shocks reduce markets efficiency by contracting the supply of goods, increasing transactions costs and shrinking the size of trade networks, and conflict imposes additional costs beyond destruction. By increasing uncertainty and risk, conflict forces households and firms to change behaviours to avoid being targeted or to minimize the potential losses after an attack. Firms are closed, agricultural producers prefer to cultivate crops of low risk and low returns and households use cattle to cover drops in income.

The study further was set to find out other Negative physiological implications of youth involvement in violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State. The findings are discussed below. The consequences of exposure to violence are as sweeping as the scope of violence itself, not only in terms of the acute and chronic health problems that accompany many of the types of violence women and girls experience, but also because victimization can increase risk of future ill-health for survivors. Evidence from across the world indicates that violence seriously undermines youths' physical, sexual, and mental health. Mental health effects may include somatic complaints, depression, anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and suicidality. Physical health effects of violence include injuries that can cause both acute and chronic illness, impacting neurological, gastrointestinal, muscular, urinary, and reproductive systems (World Health Organization, 2015). Sexual health effects include unwanted pregnancies, complications from unsafe abortions, and sexually transmitted infections. A growing body of literature provides evidence of an association between violence and HIV/AIDS. Victims of violence may suffer further because of the stigma associated with violence against them, putting them at greater social and economic risk due to community and family ostracism (McClure, 2014). However, many of these effects are hard to identify, not least because of the under-reporting associated with violence.

The respondents were further asked whether the Government Involvement helps in Eradicating acts of violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State. The results are shown below.




Figure 7: Government involvement in eradicating acts of violent conflict
Source: Research Findings (2019)

From the figure above, 85% of the respondents noted that the government involvement has not helped in eradicating acts of violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State and 15% noted that it has helped in eradicating acts of violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State. This implies that the government involvement has not helped in eradicating acts of violent conflict in Bor Jonglei State. Hence more needs to be done to end the violence.

1.10 Conclusion

The study concludes that ignorance and illiteracy are big factors among the three ethnic communities, common high rate of unemployment among youth, a lack of social and economic development in the eleven involved counties, poverty, tribal and clan jealousy, lack of strong political awareness, civic education and nationalism. Fragile political and social institutions, factors of war, trauma and wounds, lust for cattle which leads to raiding, lack of organized grass grazing areas for pasture, and lack of development and infrastructure in the states, e.g feeder roads etc are the major causes of violent conflict in Jonglei state. Violent conflict in South Sudan is politically driven. Political supremacy has been a source of conflict among the Jonglei state political leaders, militias were also a cause of internal conflict in South Sudan, foreign interference contributed to internal conflicts in Jonglei state, South Sudan, unemployment was a cause of internal conflicts in Jonglei state, internal Conflicts affected the relationship between Nuer, Dinka and Murle communities, and conflict resolution in Jonglei state has poorly been conducted. Violent conflict in Jonglei has caused killings, forced migration, long-term refugee problems, and the destruction of infrastructure. Social, political, and economic institutions have been permanently damaged. The consequences of war, especially civil war, for development are profound. Conflicts are devastating since they affect both the supply of and demand for social services and health infrastructure. Violence increases the demand for many types of services. During conflict, regimes divert resources from health and social services to military expenditure and fighting itself destroys critical infrastructure such as hospitals and health centres, and the transportation network that

brings people to these locations. Violent conflict destroys public and private assets, thereby decreasing the productive capacity of the firms, aggressions against the population erode human capital by killing and maiming as well as reducing school enrolment and deteriorating the health conditions of the population, violent shocks reduce markets efficiency by contracting the supply of goods, increasing transactions costs and shrinking the size of trade networks, and conflict imposes additional costs beyond destruction. By increasing uncertainty and risk, conflict forces households and firms to change behaviour to avoid being targeted or to minimize the potential losses after an attack. Firms are closed, agricultural producers prefer to cultivate crops of low risk and low returns and households use cattle to cover drops in income.

Violent violence seriously undermines youths' physical, sexual, and mental health. Mental health effects may include somatic complaints, depression, anxiety, alcohol and drug abuse, and suicidality. Physical health effects of violence include injuries that can cause both acute and chronic illness, impacting neurological, gastrointestinal, muscular, urinary, and reproductive systems. Sexual health effects include unwanted pregnancies, complications from unsafe abortions, and sexually transmitted infections. A growing body of literature provides evidence of an association between violence and HIV/AIDS. Victims of violence may suffer further because of the stigma associated with violence against them, putting them at greater social and economic risk due to community and family ostracism. However, many of these effects are hard to identify, not least because of the under-reporting associated with violence.

Violent conflict hinders youth economic development in Jonglei state. The persistence of poverty and underutilization of resources combined with social injustice contributed to tension and confrontation in Jonglei South Sudan. Oftentimes most of the youth are fighting which in return leads to underdevelopment. Due to conflict, there are no activities in Jonglei that will contribute to youth livelihoods security improvement and the overall economic development of the state in question.

1.11 Recommendation

The study recommends that the government of South Sudan and the peace agreement signatories in line with their existing commitments, should support the inclusion of a people-centred goals on peace, governance and justice in a development framework. The proposed targets aimed at addressing drivers of violence, conflict and insecurity should be consolidated and improved through consultation with civil society, examples are bulding schools, introduce agricultural schemes, construct physical infrastructure.

There should be increased accountability of regional multilateral institutions and national governments through transparent systems which measure and monitor forms of violence and conflict, rule of law and access to justice, governance and security provision using harmonized indicators.

The young people are at high risk of becoming both victims and perpetrators of armed violence, the study recommends that the state should promote their social and economic inclusion by providing opportunities for education and skills development for decent livelihoods in terms of opening vocational trainings centres. Also call for the increased engagement of youth in decision-making at all levels to harness the capacity of young people as social leaders.

There should be institutional approaches to policy and service provision to address the needs and

protect the rights of victims of armed violence - across areas of health, justice and social and economic inclusion – and for the empowerment of survivors to engage in processes to reduce armed violence.

There is need for intellectuals, politicians, and traditional authorities to come together to work out a durable solution to conflict in Jonglei State eg. Peace and Nation building programs. Government should build strong political, economic and social institutions in the state, revise and strengthen the native administrative court under traditional authorities and leaders implement federalism as enshrined in the Revitalised agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.

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