

## A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S IMPACT ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE PROCESS

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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Chief Editor</b>  Web: <a href="http://www.ijsdc.org">www.ijsdc.org</a>  Email: <a href="mailto:info@ijsdc.org">info@ijsdc.org</a></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Editing Oversight</b>  Impericals Consultants  International Limited</p>	<p><b>Abstract:</b> The African Union is the world’s largest and the most diverse regional blocs in terms of the membership to the institution, geographical size features and diverse income levels. It is also characterized by some of the poorest and conflict prone countries in the world. On the other hand, the European Union is considered to be the cornerstone of regional integration process in the world today and the most progressed regional community in the world thereby serving as a model. EU has been a good partner in offering peace and security support to the African Union integration process. The objective of this study is therefore (i) To assess the impact of EU financial support to AMISOM towards the peace keeping military intervention in Somalia and (ii) To establish the effectiveness of EU support to Peace initiatives within AU Peace and Security Architecture. In order to evaluate this, the study has used the theory of Functionalism for reference. The research design employed is qualitative research method with desk review of the available secondary data being the main method of data collection.</p>
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### 1.1 Study background/introduction

Article 3 section (f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union identifies promotion peace, security, and stability on the continent as one of the defining objectives of the Union. Further, the Union prioritizes sustainable development, socio-economic growth of the continent among others, as avenue within which integration of the continent can be achieved. In an EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon in 2007, The EU and Africa agreed that through establishment of and Africa Peace

Facility (APF), the EU would backstop Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), by making a substantial financial contribution to reinforce African led peace support operations in various AU member's states that were engaged in conflict, in cooperation with the relevant African regional organizations. Consequently, the EU has been very instrumental in helping the African Union operationalize APSA. One area where this is visible is Somalia where payment of AMISOM Soldiers allowance has become the EU's single largest development project in Africa. In this paper I have analysed the support EU has given towards the management of the conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. I have sought to find out how the support has transformed the conflict situation in Somalia.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

The cooperation between the Africa and the Europe has existed for many decades. Parshotam (2018) writes that the relationship began being institutionalized in the 1960s through the Yaoundé Association Agreements which later became the Lome conventions, and eventually the current Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) in 2007. Scherwitz & Poli (2009) note that the main objective of the cooperation was to improve the relations between OAU-AU and the EEC-EU for mutual benefits such and development and peace. Part 4 of Article 131 of Treaty of Rome included a clause named the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories which would see to it that there is association with members outside Europe, including African states, to promote peace and stabilization of the African Continent following the atrocities of colonialism.

Regional Integration model had attained peace in Europe especially between the warring Germany and France. It was thought then that if Africa was supported to unite and become one, problems of conflicts would be solved since no one would risk attacking a neighbor in whom they depended economically on. To date according to Scheipers & Sicurelli (2008) the objectives of cooperation mentioned above have not achieved as was envisaged in the African continent. Moore (1996) attribute this problem to the fact that although ECC-EU and OAU-AU are similar in that they were both formed at the same time, the difference comes in though when you analyse the objectives keenly. The OUA-AU purpose of cooperation was more political while that of the ECC-EU was more on economic integration. For example, objective (b) of the ECC talks about establishment of a common market while (c) talks about abolition of obstacles to free movement of persons and other factors of production. On the other hand, the OAU was keen on promotion and solidarity of the African states and defending sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African states.

Secondly according to Moore (1996), a review of the legal framework of the OAU, indicate that the African leaders formed regional blocs with the expectation that the financial support to implement the objectives would come from the western nations especially Europe. In his inaugural speech of the OAU in 1963, the former president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah argued that Europe was responsible for the challenges that Africa was experiencing. "The people of Africa call for a breaking down of boundaries that keep them apart. They demand an end to the border disputes between sister African States – disputes that arise out of the artificial barriers that divided us. It was colonialism's purpose that left us with our border irredentism that rejected our ethnic and cultural fusion" (Nkrumah, 1963). European countries at the very least were expected to solve the problems that they had helped create.

### 1.3 Study objectives

- i) To assess the impact of EU financial support to AMISOM towards the peace keeping military intervention in Somalia
- ii) To establish the effectiveness of EU support to Peace initiatives within AU Peace and Security Architecture.

### 1.4 Justification

This study is justified by the amount of investment accorded to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the African Union which has been termed as EU's single largest development project in Africa. The purpose of this cooperation is to among other things is to spur economic and social development that is brought about by peace. Yet to date, many years after independence, many African nations are still experiencing civil wars, post-election violence and resource based conflicts. The timeliness of this is necessitated by the shift in focus of how the EU conducts its engagement in the African Continent. Over the recent past, the EU has been engaging with the African Union as opposed to before when it would work with individual member states and development partners. This shows that the EU recognizes the role played by the AU as the champion of peace through the APSA.

The study aims at contributing to ways in which the cooperation between the EU and the AU on peace and security can be enhanced by evaluating how the relationship is fairing, without which, African nations will continue to marred by conflicts.

### 1.5 Literature review

#### *Theoretical Review*

#### *Theory of Functionalism*

Functionalism is a classical theory of regional integration which was proposed by David Mitrany (1943). This theory argues that the common need of technocratic management of the societal challenges informs the need to form international institution/agencies to deal with the challenges. Due to the ability of this institutions to solve human needs they gain legitimacy overtime, people allegiance shifts from the government to these institutions that met their needs when the governments were unable to. In the long run, the agencies evolve into world governments though perhaps not a true state. For the purpose of this paper the European union has is used as an institution that is driving the peace process in Somalia, a challenge that the local government has been unable to save since the day independence was attained.

Haas (1964) argues that states transfer complex competencies to supra national institutions through transnational elites. Due to more cooperation need for further transfer of competences into new areas emerges. The more the transnational elites interact, the more they develop common views and interests. Hence, for the elite's development of a collective foreign policy instrument which represents how the EU works. Jarvie (1986) finds the weakness of this theory to be the fact that, it fails to account for role of individual action. It places a lot of emphasis on institutions.

#### *Literature review*

The European Union and the African Union held a joint Summit in Cairo in 2000. The summit identified peace and security, as a key strategy area of that required serious collaboration between the two institutions. The abundance of natural resources particularly in the area of energy security

has been sighted as one of the reason EU is very much interested with having a peaceful Africa. Due to the unpredictability of the Middle East and easing EUs dependency on Russia compounded by emerging economies such a China and India, Africas' stability is important towards the EU achieving its economic interests. From a moral perspective, the EU derives the urge to help Africa manage conflict from the guilt of colonisation. Colonisation is to a greater extent is responsible for fragmentation of Africa which has led to many conflicts that have slowed down development.

Gawaya, (2017) notes that it was in this summit in Cairo that a clear link between peace and development was made and collaboration between these areas prioritised as a strategy of achieving development. The strategy identified regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime and state failures as the main threats to peace in the African continent. To manage, contain and prevent conflict, a multidimensional method was proposed. This method would include a wide range of human security enhancement which include civilian and military instruments.

The two institutions have devised a three pronged approach to achieve peace and security agenda. One approach is ensuring the immediate short-term funding to prevent and address crises as they occur via the Early Response Mechanism; Secondly, investing in medium to long-term support for African Peace Support Operations and lastly longer-term support for institutional capacity building in peace and security.

The PSOs are aimed at providing public security through a range of military and civilian tasks, including peacekeeping, maintenance of public order, policing, infrastructure reconstruction, political dialogue and national reconciliation. The APF has provided support to 14 African-led PSOs in 18 countries Since 2004, Some of the African-led Peace Support Operations supported by the EU include:- African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ECOWAS Mission to Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), The Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA); IGAD-led Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan. African Union deployment of Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi (Burundi HROs/MEs) ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force

As a mechanism of promoting peace in the continent, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been established. Invoking the provision of the treaty which allows AU to intervene in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, APSA has gained legitimacy of being the body that is mandated to promote and maintain peace. The primary objective APSA is to promote peace, security and stability in African continent and the Regional Economic Communities, Mpyisi, (2012). APSA mandate relates to, prevention of conflicts, management of conflicts when they occur, resolution of conflicts and recovery of communities destroyed by conflicts post the war. APSA is governed by Peace and Security Council protocol. The protocol came into force in December 2003, following its adoption in earlier in 2002 in Durban South Africa. APSA, has adopted the following institutions to support in its implementation of its mandate.

**Peace and Security Council (PSC):** According Article 2, (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union), the PSC is responsible for the decision making on behalf of APSA. The decision the organ has a mandate over revolve around prevention

of conflicts, management of conflict when conflicts occur. PSC, approves all peace related activities and legitimises peace operations. The PSC is also responsible for ensuring that the political and the security wing of the African Union are in harmony.

**Panel of the Wise:** PoW acts as an advisory platform which warns and advises that there is likely hood of conflict arising. The panel comprises of five highly renowned individuals who are appointed by the chairperson of the African Union Commission. The appointment is done in consultation with the member states where the personalities come from.

**Continental Early Warning System:** This is a system that is designed to collect conflict related data across the continent, analyse it guided by agreed upon early warning indicators. The purpose of this system is to enhance preparedness and timely response to conflict situations.

**African Standby Force (ASF):** Once the early warning data is analysed, should there be legitimate threat to peace and security in a certain area, a multidisciplinary contingent is sent to restore peace and order. The contingent is made up of military and civilian personnel. For, the missions to be conducted, they have to be approved by the Assembly of the African Union.

**Military Staff Committee:** This is a committee which is made up of chief of defences of the member states that serve in the Peace and Security Council. They have a responsibility of advising the PSC on military equipment and military personnel matters.

**Peace Fund:** This is an account which draws funds from the African Union budget, non-state actors support including the civil society and the private sector as well as voluntary contributions from individuals. In essence the Peace fund is the financial arm of the PSC.

APSA operates under the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES), a first of its kind initiative where the EU engages the AU directly unlike before where the Africa was lumped together with other counties in the Asian Continent. Of all the preceding frameworks of cooperation between the EU and Africa, it was JAES that gave the serious consideration to conflict prevention, management and resolution. Previous framework concentrated on trade agreement and donor aid to foster development through the Millennium Development Goals. JAES highlighted the link between security, peace and development.

The implementation of the ASPA has been facing a myriad of challenges. Top on the list being weak institutions which are incapable of dealing sufficiently with conflicts which crop up from everywhere. Incapacity of APSA is further compounded by the fact that APSA is grappling with addressing existing conflicts and building lasting peace concurrently. Due to these inadequacies, APSA has partnered with the EU through the framework of African Peace Facility (APF). (APF), is the protocol which guides implementation of EU-AU cooperation on peace and security. Since creation, in 2004, the APF has supported peace and security in Africa with more than 60% of APSA overall budget. These funds are meant to “Silence the guns before 2020” by; (i) Supporting African-led peace support operations, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, the African Union Mission to Somalia, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force (DSA). (ii) Establishment of Early Warning Mechanism. (iii) Mediation activities and fact-finding missions. The purpose of the EU involvement is also to liberate the EU from the pressure of intervening in African conflicts all the time.

EU acknowledges the need to let African Union own and drive the process of peace keeping in the continent thereby coming in, in the aspects of financial support. Through African Peace Facility, EU has supported various peace missions in different African States. Under 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, EU allocated a start-up budget of €250M for institutional capacity building programmes of the APSA. Since

then, EU has availed significant amount of funds to support the peace operations such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS); African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) among others. The table below shows some of the main programmes funded by the EU since the formation of the APF.

Table 1: Programmes funded by EU since the formation of APF

<b>PROGRAMME</b>	<b>AMOUNT IN EUROS</b>	<b>DURATION</b>	<b>STRATEGIC PRIORITY AREAS</b>
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	€ 1 638 000 000	03/2007 – Ongoing	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)	€ 19 169 601	1/09/2014 - 31/10/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) – ECOMIB I & II	€ 15 196 792	16/07/2015 – 31/12/2017	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
EU Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force	€ 100 000 000	08/2017 – Ongoing	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram	€ 50 000 000	1/07/2016 – 31/12/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Support to the African Union Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi	€ 7 847 365	1/11/2016 – 31/03/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance

Source: Olsen, 2008

The finances are used to procure information and communications equipment, soldier's uniform, health facilities and equipment, transport logistics and soldiers per diems. The only cost the EU does not take up is procurement of military arms. EU support to the African Union is therefore in two ways; i.e. Institutional capacity and Direct military operations in the field. Paying AMISOM's monthly allowances has become the EU's single largest development project in Africa. Marco, (2008) highlights that EU has been funding AMISOM since 2007 through the [African Peace Facility \(APF\)](#). Since 2004, it has disbursed more than €2 billion.

This paper has focused on the financial support disbursed to the African Union Mission to Somalia, as a case study.

### **African Union Mission in Somalia**

AMISOM was established by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19<sup>th</sup> January, 2007. Its Mandate is to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FDS), to stabilize the nation. The Republic of Somalia before and after Independence has been plagued by deadly conflicts emanating from power struggles, identity politics, terrorism and the political economy of organized violence. AMISOM is funded by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and several partners notably the EU, US, and UK—as well as assistance from a private firms, such as Bancroft Global Development. Williams (2017) notes that while bilateral donors provided most training, equipment, and mentoring support for the TCCs, the EU provides the allowances for AMISOM's uniformed personnel as well as some other forms of support. After 2009, the UN joined the donor pool by providing logistical support to the mission through its Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Williams (2017) concludes that Calculating the overall cost of AMISOM's activities would therefore involve the sum of bilateral support to the TCCs, AMISOM's annual budget, additional donor support (through the trust funds) as well as UNSOA's budget. Between 2009 and 2016, the annual cost of running AMISOM rose from approximately \$350 million to \$900 million. EU funds are used for: Covering allowances for AMISOM troops, salaries and allowances for the police contingents of the mission, international and local civilian staff salaries, operational costs for the mission's offices in Nairobi/Mogadishu and the AMISOM General Dhagabadan Training Camp in Mogadishu and Costs for AMISOM quick impact projects (QIPs).

#### **1.6 Methodology**

The research paper has adopted evaluation research design. This design is most the most appropriate in accounting for resources given to the AU, as well as describing their impact and assessing the effectiveness of the of the resources in conflict prevention, resolution and management. The method of data collection employed is desk review of secondary materials available.

AMISOM has been used a case study of the EU involvement in peace and security mandate of the African Union. Kothari (2004) finds case study method 'as a very popular form of qualitative analysis and involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an institution, a cultural group or even the entire community'.

#### **1.7 Data analysis and interpretation**

##### **Impact of the EU support towards conflict prevention, resolution and management in Somalia**

The EU has been a faithful partner of the APSA since its formation by providing allowances and supporting trainings. In addition to that the EU makes its contribution regularly to UN peacekeeping initiatives used to fund UNSOA/UNSOS. The member countries of the EU notably France and Italy also provide additional and separate funds to APSA. It is therefore fair to conclude that the EU has met its end of the bargain in supporting peace keeping in the African Union.

As a result of this support, AMISOM has significantly reduced the areas under al-Shabaab control. As a result of urban bloody warfare between the AMISOM soldiers and the Al-Shabaab militias,

AMISOM has driven majority of Al-Shabaab fighters out of Mogadishu and its environs. From 2012, following the addition of more troops from Kenya and Djibouti, the mission also pushed most al-Shabaab forces out of several many urban settlements in south-central Somalia, including Kismayo and Baidoa. Williams (2019) notes that this has provided respite from the harsh rules of al-Shabaab's governance and encouraged leadership by the local communities. Secondly, in 2012 and 2016–2017, AMISOM played a big role in ensuring that two elections were carried out which established new federal governments in 2012 and 2017, respectively.

Thirdly, in its period of Operations, through support to transport and conference facilities, AMISOM has played a pivotal role in the establishment of south-central Somalia's new Regional Administrations namely, Jubaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016). Without those new regions, it would be impossible for Somalia to build a federal system of government. Lastly, during the AMISOM's period of operation, AMISOM has provided security to international diplomatic and humanitarian communities to operate out of Mogadishu and across south-central Somalia.

To date, the EU is also the biggest donor to Somalia, not only in the peace and security front but also in livelihoods support through its EU long term development strategy in Horn of Africa. Using Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, (ACP) financial instrument, the EU has channeled billions of euros on governance, education, economic growth, and support to food security, health, environment, water and sanitation. The money allocated to the above mentioned sectors have been replenished every five years through the platform of the European Development Fund (EDF). Although this has gone a long way in helping protect the livelihoods and establishing lasting institutional framework in the horn of Africa, upscaling investments in the institutions of public goods such as roads and electricity should be considered. Such investments have been proven to boost development quickly than the livelihood support to sectors. This has been attributed to the fact that such investments go directly to the masses unlike their livelihood sector support that is characterized by high administrative budgets.

The European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshal plan serves as a perfect example which assisted the Western European nations recover from the devastation of the world war two. The program, established in 1948 and injected more than \$15 billion which was at the time a humongous sum to finance rebuilding efforts Europe. The four-year program assisted in reconstruction of cities, industries and infrastructure heavily damaged during the war.

Similarly, the EU has supported construction of a 118-Kilometer-long section on an international road between Merrille and Marsabit in Kenya. The small section has opened Northern Kenya towns to tourism and business on top of linking them up with the neighboring Ethiopia. Such program should be prioritized to the dominant sectorial support.

### **Challenges associated with EU support towards conflict prevention, resolution and management in Somalia**

One of the challenges that EU support has faced is the controversies that AMISOM been marred with emanating from the to the reduction of the soldiers per diems. The EU reduced the allowances by 20%, from \$1,028 to \$822 per soldier, per month, Williams (2017). The new rates revised according to standard UN reimbursement rate. Secondly, the delaying of Burundians soldiers per diems occasioned by EU Council decision to impose sanctions on Burundi resulted in Burundi



threatening to withdraw its troops.

The longevity of the mission is another point of concern. For instance, the January of 2020 marked 13 years of AMISOMs existence. Military operations are not meant to stay that long in an area. The main objective of military operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time, until civil authorities can do so without being assisted by the military. Prolonged stay in Somalia is risky considering that there are other pressing issues that are emerging in other areas in the continents and focus can be shifted any time. Besides, in disaster management when disasters prolong for a long time, donor community tend to suffer from compassion fatigue leading to their pooling out even if the disaster, for this case conflict has not resolved.

On the JAES, Many Africans hold the view that if indeed Joint Strategy is truly an equal partnership, there should be serious discussions about human's rights violations in Europe especially against people of African and Arab descent. Many scholars feel that the emphasis by the EU on values and shared norms of good governance, human rights and respect to the rule of law is full of double standards and insincerity. This is not to mean that human rights in Africa should be condoned or any less relevant. The double standards employed by Europe is consequently less likely to yield any result in helping the cause of democratization and good governance within the AU member states.

EU has greatly been criticized of being at the fore front of demonizing violations of governmental and human right but becoming rather silent when German Chancellor Angela Merkel goes to China to sign contracts worth billions regardless of Chinese human rights record. This because the economic weight of China is much bigger than that of all Africa put together, hence it goes to depict that, when countries are of strategic geopolitical or economic importance their governance credentials are not important. Instead, small and poor countries are bullied into highhanded EU standards.

### **1.8 Conclusion**

In conclusion EU support has led to peaceful transformation of the Horn of Africa region. In Somalia specifically, the EU has led to capturing of Kismayu, making Mogadishu peaceful. Two democratic elections have been carried out, hopefully marking the end of violent government regimes transition. Supporting African responses to violent conflicts across the continent is of major importance to the European Union (EU). However, this is not only out of goodwill. The abundance of natural resources particularly in the area of energy security has been sighted as one of the reason EU is very much interested with having a peaceful Africa.

On the negative side, the support has made the peace support operations be heavily reliant on donor aid. The total dependence of APSA to financial aid from the EU is very risky. Should EU funds end, then APSA would collapse. Secondly, EU has instituted a model that can only be instituted through the EU support. Very expensive, a model which requires high level of technology advancement to be sustained. The paper has established that the EU also supports parallel institutions to deal with democracy and peace in the horn of Africa such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Security is such a delicate matter that should be dealt with in a methodical and planned manner. The multiplicity of different agencies involvement complicates the matter rather than solve.

This research found out that some members of the EU do pursue separate peace policies of their

own outside the EU-APSA. As a result, the EU member states military activities in some parts of Africa for example the EU forces in Chad (EUFOR) have been regarded as counter-productive. As a result, the competing agendas of EU might to an extent undermine the JAES framework in the areas of peace and security.

### **1.9 Recommendation**

African Union has expressed the desire to take up ownership of the Unions by increasing member's contribution towards implementation of programmes. Financing the Union decree made in Kigali in 2016 where the AU Member States are expected to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the AU and reducing dependency on partner funds should be enforced. As it is now, the JAES slogan 'African problem, African solutions' seems to have been replaced by 'African Problems, European Solutions'

With the recent exit of the UK from the European Union, it is feared that there could be serious consequences for development assistance in Africa. United Kingdom is among the biggest contributors to the European Development Fund, EU's development assistance arm, which provides funds to developing countries and regions. EDF is one of the world's largest providers of multilateral aid on peace and security. With disbursements exceeding the ones channeled through the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). While a Brexit may not necessarily deprive the EDF of its resources for development assistance entirely, direct disbursement of aid will certainly have a narrower geographical reach than before. To fill this gap, African RECs should start looking into alternative sources of funds, perhaps by encouraging increased contribution from the member states.

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