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## THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA: A CASE OF IGAD IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN, 2013-2019

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**Abstract:** *The South Sudan civil war from 2013 took over a year to mediate. Over the period before mediation, there were hundreds of thousands of casualties and derailed economic growth of South Sudan. Whereas there were numerous attempts to resolve the conflict, it is only the IGAD process that succeeded in brokering peace (IGAD, 2016). International organizations have in various instances failed to prevent war and fulfill peacekeeping duties many times throughout its history. There have been formed various regional organizations that step in conflict management where the international organizations fail. This study sought to examine the role of regional organizations and conflict management in Africa with particular focus on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in South Sudan. The objectives of the study explored into the IGAD's intervention approach adopted in South Sudan Mediation process, the challenges it experienced and the effects of IGAD's engagement to the South Sudan Conflict management. Deploying the Ripeness and Realism theories and relevant statistical aided to analyze both primary and secondary data, the study concluded that IGAD's role in the South Sudan peace process was multifaceted as the mediator, facilitator and supervisor of the process. The study population comprised IGAD Officials, Policy makers/Experts/academicians, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officials, Diplomats, religious Leaders and Village Elders. The study adopted a census approach and thus the sample size was the 36 IGAD officials, diplomats, policy makers/experts/academicians, and ministry of foreign affairs officials, religious leaders and village elders in the South Sudan peace process. The study utilized composite Questionnaires and one on one interviews as the primary research instruments. The interviews were administered physically or through email. The response were analyzed and their findings discussed with recommendations.*

**Keywords:** *Regional Organizations, Conflict Management, IGAD & South Sudan.*

## 1.1 Study Background

The role of international organizations in the realm of conflict management and peace building in Africa is a noteworthy development. The United Nations and other international organizations have taken different roles in mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building interventions. The international organizations were created with the hope of creating international cooperation and to prevent another such conflict. However, International organizations have in various instances failed to prevent war and fulfill peacekeeping duties many times throughout its history. Millions of people around the world have been killed and displaced since the UN was founded in 1945. There have been formed various regional organizations that step in conflict management. This study sought to examine the role of regional organizations in conflict management in Africa with the case of IGAD in the republic of South Sudan.

The United Nations Organization was established in 1945 following the end of the Second World War. One of the key founding principles of the UN, as enshrined in the charter of the body was an encouragement of member states to resolve disputes through peaceful means. Among the key conflicts and crises that the United Nations has intervened since its inception include the numerous wars fought in the context of the cold war, the wars waged to achieve the liberation of former colonial territories in Africa and Asia, and the Gulf war, to mention but few. The major conflicts in which the United Nations intervened after its formation include the Suez Crisis 1956, Congo Conflict 1960, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Liberation wars in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, the various conflicts in the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf Wars 1991 and 2003 among others (Gordon, 2016).

It is within this context that the establishment of regional bodies to intervene in conflict resolution should be understood. These bodies are established to supplement the UN system based on their deeper understanding of regional conflicts and their acceptability among actors involved in these conflicts. Moreover, these bodies exist to supplement the UN system in accelerating political, social and economic integration within specific regions (Imseis, 2019). The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 with a mandate to enhance regional cooperation in food security, environmental protection, economic cooperation, regional integration, social development peace and security (IGAD treaty, 2019). Its predecessor institution IGADD was founded in 1986 with the mandate to mitigate the effects of severe droughts, natural disasters, famine, ecological degradation and economic challenges in the region.

At its inception the IGAD membership comprised six countries namely: Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Eritrea joined the organization in 1993 upon attaining its independence from Ethiopia. After gaining its independence from the Republic of Sudan, South Sudan joined IGAD in 2011. Presently, IGAD stands out as the pre-eminent body with the East African and horn of Africa region. Since its inception, IGAD has intervened in various conflicts within the region including Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrean war, Sudan and Kenya (Marigat et al, 2017).

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

South Sudan should be a country full of hope eight years after gaining independence. Instead, it's now in the grip of a massive humanitarian crisis. Political conflict, compounded by economic woes and drought, has caused massive displacement, raging violence and dire food shortages. Over seven million people, about two thirds of the population are in need of aid, including around 6.9 million people experiencing hunger. The ongoing conflict and insecurity have pushed millions to the brink of starvation for years. In 2017, famine was declared in two counties in South Sudan, and famine has remained a persistent threat since. In December 2013, political infighting erupted into violence in the streets of the capital, Juba, after South Sudan's president accused his vice president of an attempted coup. Violence spread across the young nation like wildfire, displacing 413,000 civilians in just the first month of conflict. Tens of thousands of civilians rushed to seek refuge in U.N. bases that were subsequently turned into makeshift displacement camps. A handful of peace agreements have been signed over the course of the war — the most recent in September 2018 — but they have been repeatedly violated. While reported incidents of conflict have decreased somewhat since the new deal, the situation in South Sudan remains highly unstable and outbreaks of violence continue.

There have been formed various regional organizations that step in conflict management where the international organizations fail (AU, 2017). According to Young (2017), in 2014, the IGAD peace process succeeded resulting in the “Accord Compromise Peace Agreement” that eventually allowed the 2015 peace deal. According to Natsios (2012) whereas there were numerous attempts to resolve the conflict, it is only the IGAD process that succeeded in brokering peace. However, the chances of success from IGAD'S intervention have been challenged by Getachew (2018) in a research paper, “The Rose of IGAD: A regional Approach to crisis in South Sudan”, who argued that the special interest and involvement of members of IGAD especially Uganda and Sudan affected organization ability to act as an impartial mediator (Wilson Centre, 2014).

While Marigat et al, (2017) discussed the role played by the distribution of power among IGAD member states in the mediation process, Vertin (2019) assesses the challenges and intrigues that characterized the peace process under IGAD and the reasons for various failures. Prior studies have focused on the role of IGAD in the previous peace process and the challenges and successes registered by the organization in the process Johnson (2011) and Johnson (2016). Natsios (2012) discusses the historical evolution of the Republic of Sudan, The Republic of South Sudan and explores the factors that generated the conflict fault lines that we witness in both countries today. De Waal (2015) the role of kleptocratic establishment and the patronage it engendered in the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan. Therefore this study sought to examine the role of regional organizations in conflict management in Africa with the case of IGAD in the republic of South Sudan.

## 1.3 Objectives of the Study

- i. To examine the IGAD's intervention approach adopted in the South Sudan Mediation process.


- ii. To establish the challenges and success experienced by IGAD during the South Sudan Conflict mediation process and the effects of IGAD’s mediation during the Process.
- iii. To propose alternatives on the role of IGAD in the management of the South Sudan conflict.

**1.4 Research Questions**

- i. What intervention approaches were adopted by IGAD during South Sudan’s peace process?
- ii. What challenges and success were encountered by IGAD during the South Sudan mediation process and the effects of IGAD’s mediation in the South Sudan conflict.
- iii. What are the possible alternatives on the role of IGAD in the management of the South Sudan conflict?

**1.5 Conceptual Framework**

A conceptual framework helps to clarify the relationship or relationships between the variables in the study and demonstrate how they diagrammatically interrelate (Lune & Berg, 2016). In this study, the core variables are the approaches that IGAD adopted in the management of the South Sudan conflict 2013-2019, the challenges it faced during the process and the effects of its mediation in the entire process. This is diagrammatically in Figure 1.



**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework**

## 1.6 Literature Review

### *Theoretical Framework*

#### *Ripeness Theory*

The original core theory, first devised by William Zartman, asserts that the conjunction of just two conditions a mutual hurting stalemate and a perceived way out is necessary, though not sufficient, for conflict to move into negotiation. Revised and adapted over time by scholars and practitioners, ripeness theory has served as a critical tool in conflict resolution over the past decades.

The theory argues that an actor's readiness for conflict resolution is a function of both motivation to end the conflict and optimism about the success of negotiation. The model defines ripeness as the breadth of the 'central coalition' of ready individuals and of subgroups, a coalition that spans both sides of the conflict divide (Zartman, 2000). Ripeness theory, in its most common version, concerns the psychological states that encourage parties who are involved in severe conflict to move into negotiation either bilateral or mediated.

In the case of the South Sudan conflict, the conflicting parties have engaged in hostilities for more than five years now. Although the frontlines and allegiances of the various factions have shifted over time, the stalemate obtaining on the diplomatic front has remained almost unchanged. The Addis Ababa 2015 agreements were violated by both sides reverting the country to war. The implementation of the 2018 Khartoum agreement is underway and its success or failure is therefore yet to be determined (Brereton & Ayuko, 2016). In between and before, numerous ceasefire agreements mediated by various bodies, including IGAD have been flouted with impunity. However, based on the prevailing domestic and international pressures, coupled with the apparent realization among the key combatants that a military solution is not feasible, this study deploys the Ripeness theory to argue that the South Sudanese leaders are prepared to make peace.

The theory is relevant as it is intended to explain why, and therefore when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others' efforts to turn the conflict toward resolution through negotiation. The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties' perception of a mutually hurting stalemate optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe.

#### *Ethnic Theory: Primordialist Theory*

The linking of 'ethnic' and 'conflict' has been conducted in various ways, and this variety brought less generalizable concepts of ethnicity. Once they were diffused into parts and particular aspects to trace the reasons of ethnic conflicts, general definitions of ethnicity and ethnic groups develop into a wide range of perceptions with more specific focal points (Caselli, 2016). An ethnic group in accordance with this definition would be based on an entrenched, fixed and unchangeable ethnicity, since the point of departure here is the factors that individuals are not able to control. In other words, ethnic groups are formed around factors that are fully external to the members of the group. This reflects the 'given' elements behind ethnic identities, a common point for the primordialist readings of ethnic conflict (Carment, 2013).

In parallel, however less-biologic, Geertz emphasises the 'givens' behind 'primordial attachments'

by stating that religion and language members born into and kinship are determining factors of ethnic groups. Accordingly, elements such as personal conceptualisation, interests, and necessities are rejected in primordialist accounts of ethnicity. This theory of ethnic conflict therefore has two implications (Esteban & Ray, 2008). First, when ethnic identity is conceived as a biologic given, then an inference can be made that ethnic conflicts are inherent to human nature. Second, when the emphasis is made on 'social givens' such as kinship, family, language and religion (as Geertz argues), then ethnic conflict can occur only when these values are at stake. These primordialist notions are salient in ethnic conflicts as 'ethnic emotions', which are believed to be stemming from the factors that are out of ethnic groups' control. Blagojevic mentions 'ancient hatreds' as one of these ethnic emotions. In this vein, when the group's ethnic identity is thought to be at stake, reactions of ethnic emotions evolve into conflicts (Bakwesegha, Brubaker, Connor, Ellis, Esman, van der Stoel & Zartman, 2014).

This theory is relevant to this study in that emotions are understood as reflections of 'primordial attachments' such as blood ties and historical memories rather than reactions of immediate necessities. Put differently, according to primordialist theory, although ethnic reactions emanate from the hatreds of an ethnic group, reasons for these outrages are the accumulations of biological, historical, unchangeable and fixed elements.

### ***Empirical Review***

Adula, (2018) conducted a study on challenges and prospects of Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace building effort in South Sudan. The study employed the qualitative research methodology. The finding of study revealed that different challenges hindered IGAD's peace building effort in South Sudan, inter alia, lack of enough fund for peace building effort, in appropriate intervention of IGAD's member state such as Uganda and Sudan in South Sudan for their individual interest and in appropriate peace building approach used by IGAD delegator. The study again found presence opportunities for realization of Peace building such as advents of different agreements conducted between warring parties like the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ACRSS) and all-inclusive peace building approach which invites all actors to facilitate peace building efforts than warring party alone.

Dicks, (2014) conducted a study on Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Management: A Case of IGAD in South Sudan. The study concluded that IGAD's mediation role in the Sudan conflict arose out of security interest of the member states and, IGAD effect as a regional organization enhanced the resolution of the Sudan conflict. The study has shown that the support given to IGAD by international actors by the United Nations and Major Western countries, including the US, gave the organization a moral standing with the two belligerents. The study recommends that there is need for sub regional organizations to develop a funding strategy to be independent and self-supporting. Finally there is need for member states of any organization to demonstrate commitment to the organization to facilitate its operations. Membership to multiple organizations, as happens with most of IGAD members' states, tends to dilute commitment to one or the other.

Nyadera, (2018) conducted a study on South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and solutions. The study found out that ethnic animosities and rivalry are a key underlying cause that has transformed political rivalry into a deadly ethnic dispute through

vicious mobilization and rhetoric. Therefore, it recommends a comprehensive peace approach that will address the political aspects of the conflict and propose restructuring South Sudan's administrative, economic and social spheres in order to curb further manipulation of the ethnic differences. Ngunia (2014) conducted a study on an Assessment of IGAD's Role in Conflict Management in South Sudan (2011-2013). The research design used in this study was descriptive and explorative research. The study concludes that breakdown of law and order in South Sudan creates security threats to the South Sudanese people and its neighbors. Based on the findings, the study recommends Galtung Johan's theory of constructive, concrete and creative approach prognosis in mediating, negotiating and resolution of any conflicts situation. This could be the only situation to peaceful conflict transformation. The international bodies must provide interventions to prevent negative prognoses while the local actors must maintain and be clear to the needs, and rights of the people in bringing satisfaction peaceful culture and structure.

### ***Igad's Intervention Approach Adopted in the South Sudan Mediation Process***

The IGAD is a regional organization in Africa that aims to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration in the IGAD region, which includes the six states of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Based on Article 52(2) of the United Nations (UN) Charter which provides that the regional organization can participate in an international peace and security issues (Barneth, 2015), IGAD has intervened in a number of regional conflicts within the horn of Africa with varied degrees of success.

African countries, supported by the wider international community, have been trying to broker an end to the renewed conflict. Countries of the region have used the subregional organization IGAD, with its long history of mediation in Sudanese conflicts, as the platform for ceasefire and peace negotiations. Since the December 2013 return to conflict, a number of ceasefire agreements have been struck; however, these have not lasted very long, suggesting that none of the belligerents yet feels that they have exhausted the opportunities offered by violence. It is well understood by international actors that the successive ceasefire agreements have not been observed because both sides still perceive political advantage in renewed conflict (Africa Confidential, 2016)

The unilateral military intervention by the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) added to the regional complexity of the crisis. UPDF support for the GRSS's fight against Riek Machar's forces, the SPLM-in opposition (SPLM-IO), has threatened the likelihood of a sustained Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA). The deployment also seems to be bolstering Salva Kiir, with the effect that he does not have to make changes in Juba or commit to political negotiations. Yet there are few examples of civil wars in the region that have resulted in conclusive military victories, and despite the proliferation of weapons to sustain such a conflict, an armed solution in South Sudan does not seem likely (Amnesty International, 2014).

During IGAD's 27th extraordinary summit, held at the end of August 2014, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's late intervention to alter the agreed protocol on transitional arrangements contributed to the rejection of the document by all stakeholders other than the GRSS, and a further derailing of the negotiations. This intrusion was likely made because of Museveni's unwillingness to sign into action a precedent whereby a regional head of state could be stripped of their authority as head of government. IGAD's 28th extraordinary summit, in November, concluded with a

renewed call for the establishment of a transitional government of national unity. According to Amnesty International (2014), accommodating Salva Kiir as president, James Wani Igga as vice-president and Riek Machar as prime minister in a power-sharing deal would lead to a postponement of democratic transition for the sake of short-term stability. Creating the role of executive prime minister within a presidential system could, furthermore, bring about further complications in the interim.

Although IGADs has faced a lot of criticism, it has played a vital role in many regional developments, key among hem mediation interventions which have brought renewed efforts and security towards sustainable peace and development. IGAD has been assisting South Sudan to integrate into the regional peace building architecture. The Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (CEWARN) mechanism of IGAD has been established in the South Sudan Peace building Commission. There is a need for IGAD to play an active role in promoting peaceful co-existence between the countries bearing in mind its credibility and mediation achievements. IGAD has coordinated the deployment of about civil servants from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to offer technical assistance in several ministries, commissions and local governments.

### **1.7 Research Methodology**

This study integrates both Qualitative and Quantitative approaches. Qualitatively, it interrogates human social behaviors, attitudes and opinions as they relate to and are affected by armed conflicts. Quantitatively, the study employed statistical methods of data analysis using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), graphical and other analytical and presentations aids generated using Excel to analyze and present the data and the findings. In this context a selected research design is meant to provide the strategic compass for the collection, analysis and interpretation of data while allowing the researcher opportunity draw appropriate conclusions and hopefully, a develop a theory related to the core subject, which is the role of Regional Organizations in conflict management, with a specific focus on the role played by IGAD in the South Sudan Peace process. This study has utilized a combination of the Case Research Designs and Library Research. This study attempted to use Case Study research as its core methodology.

The study population comprised IGAD Officials, Policy makers/Experts/academicians, Diplomats, religious Leaders and Village Elders. The materials available include a number of academic papers, reports by various organizations and fleeting mentions in some recent books on armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. The study adopted a census approach and thus the sample size was the 28 respondents. The study utilized composite interview guides and one on one interviews as the primary research instruments. The questionnaires were administered physically or through email. The data obtained from one-on-one interviews was, where permitted professionally recorded by use of a Dictaphone. Data analysis has been undertaken using Descriptive statistics as the basic tool. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software were used as tools of interpretation.



## 1.8 Results and Findings

### ***Findings on Interventions Approaches Adopted by IGAD***

The respondents were asked to give insight on the interventions approaches adopted by IGAD in the peace keeping mission in South Sudan. One diplomat from UN responded:

*“It was an idea of some countries to come together with a very positive approach IGAD to promote food, political, social, and economic for the continent.”*

Another diplomat from UN argued that not all IGAD countries have not been involved, consequently the implementation will be less accomplished because few countries were involved. However another religion member mentioned that IGAD approach was still an ideal approach

*“Despite the criticism faced by IGAD, I believe that it is playing a greater role in South Sudan peace building process. IGAD has been committed to capturing member states input into the strategic plan and has continuously provided ample opportunity for eliciting and coordinating member states’ input. For instance, the draft strategic framework was presented to member states and key stakeholders in November 2015. Key stakeholders who will play an important part in implementing many of the actions have also been consulted in face-to-face meetings prior to finalization of the draft strategy. Much of their input has been captured in the ‘Implementation Plan’ which accompanies this strategic framework. This document is ‘live’ for the duration of the Strategy and IGAD will periodically seek to collect data for reporting progress on the strategy and update the plan.”*

A policy expert who is involved in South Sudan conflict resolution asserted that;

*“Mediation were undertaken, for instance the high level revitalization forums IGAD pursues a pragmatic and progressive approach, which focuses on what is strategically useful and feasible politically, economically, socially and technically at regional, national and international levels, with the available human and financial resources. IGAD is adopting a holistic programmatic approach to its development initiatives instead of the stand-alone project interventions of the past. To facilitate this transformation as well as enhance its organizational performance, efficiency and effectiveness, IGAD has put in place a Result Based Management (RBM) system”*

One of the religious leader involved in the South Sudan conflict resolution noted that;

*“IGAD had its own uniqueness where did not use any force, threat sanctions or military but used friendly approach in an amicable discussion e.g. Peace Agreements. IGAD continue to dialogue and negotiate which was persistence without giving up. IGAD shall continue to maintain its proactive approach towards the relevant emerging issues, both of a regional and international nature.”*

A village leader who is among the South Sudan peace building process noted that:

*“IGAD is unique in that it pursues a pragmatic and progressive approach, which focuses on what is strategically useful and feasible politically, economically, socially and technically at regional, national and international levels, with the available human and financial resources. IGAD is adopting a holistic programmatic approach to its development initiatives instead of the stand-alone project interventions of the past. To facilitate this transformation as well as enhance its organizational performance, efficiency and effectiveness, IGAD has put in place a Result Based Management (RBM) system.”*

### **Challenges Encountered by IGAD in the South Sudan Peace Process**

The respondents were asked on the challenges encountered by IGAD in the South Sudan Peace Process. The challenges mentioned by one of the IGAD officials were that:

*“There were logistical, financial issues that undermined IGAD because of the big players like the AU and the UN. IGAD did not have the machinery but relied on the existing system and the embassies. The long chronic complex conflict had a big effects and Sudan being a new identity did not have the right negotiating bodies.”*

The challenges mentioned by the diplomats were that:

*“There were no efforts from the member states. Uganda sent troops before any meeting was convened and with any consultations with IGAD. In addition, each state had its own interest for example Ethiopia supported Khartoum. Genesis of the conflict started in the former Khartoum black man in South Sudan but could not manage its own affair and planted laments in S. Sudan putting their own people and that become a big challenge for the mediators.*

The challenges put forward by one of the village elders who is involved in South Sudan conflict resolution was that;

*“International perception of the conflict and interference through trying to use mediation to influence the outcome of the agreement. In addition, The USA came very strongly and wanted to change of government in South Sudan a number of statements came through the lead mediator indicating it was not coming from Ethiopia. In addition, there is high reliance on donor funding and delay in transfer of committed funds to IGAD”*

Another policy expert from UN cited the following challenges;

*“Characters of special envoys were not agreed upon. There was a lot of external influence. There was so many disagreements in the parties. Inclusiveness of all groups to agree was a big challenge. Power agreement – If one party had an upper hand they took advantage. There was a lot of support to the major party. There were so many unresolved issues in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the whole complexity of the S. Sudan society. Ethiopia heading IGAD for more 11 years was*

*felt as a challenge and the people needed change”.*

This study findings are consistent with that of Group report (2016) which found that the three major factors limited IGAD’s mediation and remain a challenge are regional rivalries and power struggles, centralization of decision-making at the HoS level and related lack of institutionalization within IGAD; and challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan’s political elites. Following the oft-violated January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities agreement, the HoS mediation strategy focused on deploying a regional force to create conditions for peace negotiations. When the wider international community stymied the prospective regional force and the situation stabilized by June 2014, leaders could not overcome their divisions to agree on an effective alternate strategy. This undermined the IGAD special envoys, and the warring parties opted instead to engage directly with individual HoS in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. IGAD itself had little leverage. For example, despite public threats, the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions, repeatedly called IGAD’s bluff and refused to compromise.

### ***Achievements Attained by IGAD***

The respondents were asked on the Achievements Attained by IGAD in the South Sudan. One of the IGAD officials indicated that:

*“IGAD saved a lot of lives during the signing of Agreements and gave the continent hope for resolving conflict. It also reduced a number of refugees through other member states. In addition, IGAD’s achievement has been to manage these tensions, thus contain the conflict, but rivalries prevented the head of states from agreeing on final aspects of power-sharing and security arrangements, enabling the warring parties to continue without agreeing.”*

Another religious leader who is involved in peace building process in South Sudan noted that;

*“After 2 years there was at least less fighting. Some Agreements were signed e.g. Session of hostility, the releasing of detainees and resolution of conference in S. Sudan where they agreed and signed in Addis Ababa through a very intense mediation by President of Kenya H.E Uhuru Kenyatta, Rieck Machar and Sillva Kiir where Kiir refused but when General Sumbeiywo was sent to him, he agreed. Further, the Transitional National Government Unity was formed.”*

However, one of the village elders were of the opinion that;

*“Dynamics of the parties changed when they lost the external support and Peace agreement that were signed they were never implemented and that become a very challenge. In addition, there was de-escalation of the conflict.”*

The diplomats narrated that there was signing of agreements such as CPA of 2005, ARCSS of 2015, and Cessation of hostilities in 2017 and R-ARCSS of 2018.

Butler (2019) notes that IGAD is important as a forum to regulate the regional balance of power,

but it needs high-level support if the region is to reach a unified position on peace. IGAD-PLUS should become a unifying vehicle to engage the ever-shifting internal dynamics in South Sudan more effectively and address the divisions among IGAD members that enable the parties to prolong the war. In particular, the AU high representative might lead shuttle diplomacy within the region to gain consensus on the way forward. A dedicated UN envoy for South Sudan and Sudan should represent the UN in IGAD-PLUS and coordinate the various UN components' support to the process.

### ***Failures Attributed to IGAD Intervention***

The respondents were asked on the failures attributed to IGAD intervention in the South Sudan peace process. The responses from one of the UN diplomats indicated that;

*“Failures with the party and mediation parties. They did not own the process and thought they could win through military coups. Some mediators had different interest. IGAD depended on external resources because they wanted to control the process and impose a solution. IGAD was accused of taking sides and compromised the mediation process.”*

Another policy expert working with UN agencies responded that;

*“It was not the intension IGAD to fail but after the agreement animosity encroached between themselves. This conflict is about a failure of political settlement, lack of political legitimacy and inadequate enforcement mechanism. IGAD failed in the mediation design where it did not succeed in the implementation modality. The mediators wanted inclusiveness by all those who were included in the conflict and the ones who were not i.e. civil societies, women, religious, the youth groups and the two belligerents.”*

The response on failures of the IGAD intervention further indicated that on Location, it was located in Addis Ababa which not a neutral environment. It was critical to get a neutral ground because of too much interference. The heads of states were not available many times and they needed to take time and understand the critical issues and people of South Sudan.

While the IGAD officials cited that;

*“The 2015 and 2017 agreements were not very sustained, thus there is need to interrogate why that was the case. Further, the world was looking at IGAD to solve conflict and also the refugees in South Sudan. IGAD was a growing organization and it should have been given time to grow.”*

This response is consisted with that of Tarp, Haldrup and Lassen (2016) who argued that South Sudan's civil war has brought complex rivalries between Uganda and Sudan and Uganda and Ethiopia to the fore. It has also created common ground between Kampala and Khartoum, who support the same government in Juba. Khartoum's historic southern allies, largely among the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), present equal danger and opportunity. Some in President Salva Kiir's inner circle have long ties with Sudan.<sup>1</sup> The group known as SPLM Leaders Former Detainees (FD) comprise historic Sudan People's Liberation

Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) leaders who had prominent roles in the security services, cabinet and SPLM prior to 2013 when many lost their positions and subsequently stood up against Kiir in the SPLM.2 When war broke out they were arrested, four were put on trial for alleged involvement in a coup attempt and eventually all were released to Kenya where they joined the IGAD talks as a third, unarmed party. Many of the FD are Ugandan favorites but not viewed well by Khartoum.

### ***Effects of Interventions***

The respondents were asked what effects of IGAD's intervention in the South Sudan Peace Process in the 2013-2019 period. One of the UN diplomat responded that;

*“The IGAD member states had the effects of the refugees. The population in the neighboring countries increased due to the conflict in South Sudan. The war was horrible to the people of South Sudan and it was not at all justified. There was negative impact on women and children. It affected the infrastructure development and national building.”*

Further another policy expert who is a UN consultant responded;

*“Peace and conducive environment that have enabled development to start growing, it has also allowed for reconstruction of the country. The agreements led to bringing down the number of deaths in the country, it also allowed access for humanitarian support. The agreements have led to reduced fighting in most parts of the country.”*

In addition, a village elder who is part of South Sudan's peace building process responded;

*“South Sudan has 24% literacy vs 76% which is illiterate. The elite use the illiterate to fight their wars. Everyone assumed that S. Sudan government is like any other government that has structures but the government is a devoid country. It was in the interest of Khartoum that the war doesn't stop and their prophesy comes to pass not to govern themselves. The country has really been polarized because of the leaders who cannot be able to control their people. The war has spread to Equatorial side which has 39 tribes where everyone is working to protect their people, resources and drops.”*

One of the IGAD official noted;

*“We are following the ideas which have failed and no new model ideas are there in solving the conflict. There was lack of legitimacy where Transitional constitution was not a permanent constitution.”*

Under the role of the non-actors; the Chinese had their own interest and IGAD could not do away with because they supported the negotiation in the financial support. According to Wight (2017), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediated fifteen months of peace talks led by special envoys from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. Uganda did not have an envoy because of its role as a belligerent party. Yet IGAD as an institution struggled to overcome the warring parties' unwillingness to reach agreement and internal divisions. Launched at the same time was an SPLM dialogue process, eventually led by Tanzania and South Africa's ruling parties, designed to

reconcile different factions of the SPLM and support the overall peace talks.

However, many SPLA-IO leaders have no relationship to the SPLM and thus were not part of this process. As it progressed, the SPLM dialogue created opportunities for forum shopping, undermined the IGAD talks and, in securing the return of most of the FD to Juba, strengthened the government's negotiating position. IGAD called time on its mediation in March 2015 and announced a new configuration, IGAD-PLUS, that was launched in June (Pring, 2017).

## **1.9 Conclusion**

The examination of the literature and an analysis of the empirical data establishes that IGAD intervened at various levels in an attempt to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. However, IGAD was not the only intervening entity. Other organizations, global institutions, individual countries both within and outside IGAD and broadly, the international community also intervened. However, the data further reveals that the intervening parties were not necessarily motivated by a common goal or purpose, or south Sudanese national interest. On the contrary, a number of them appear to have been motivated by interests other the expeditious resolution of the armed conflict that erupted in South Sudan in December 2013, or what they expressly stated to be their interests.

The concept of regional organizations in promotion of African solutions is important because it promotes legitimacy of peacebuilding strategies. When people are involved in peace processes, it builds trust in the government and mediation team. Every stage of the peacebuilding process represents an opportunity for local level actors to take the lead in setting the agenda, and implementation of peace agreements. In the case of the IGAD led mediation, non-armed stakeholders were sidelined, and a bilateral agreement was reached at the expense of genuine reconciliation and durable peace; this will affect the state-civil society relation negatively during the transition phase.

External actors played an important role as part of IGAD to compel armed parties to sign the peace agreement, however, they will not always be there; accordingly there is a need to empower the grassroots organisations to support the initiatives of regional bodies as partners in Africa's development. The Addis Ababa peace process revealed the disadvantaged position of the civil society, and this calls for a shift from conventional mediation to one that is more accommodative.

Establishing a culture of local ownership and inclusivity in peace processes both at the micro and macro levels is possible. Peace processes would be more complex, but societies would be guaranteed reconciliation and sustainability of peace. South Sudan's grassroots organizations have the potential to contribute meaningfully to peace process; but they lack legal capacity to act independently. Thus responsibility to involve non-armed stakeholders should be adopted as a set of guiding principles (soft law) to promote the legitimacy of non-armed stakeholders as equal partners with armed parties in peace talks.

## **1.10 Recommendations**

The materials analyzed through this study lead the presenter to make the two key recommendations

with regards to the IGAD peace mediation process. One, IGAD needs to be empowered with punitive powers to sanction any party violating its agreements and treaties for them to be effective.

Two, the IGAD process needs to embrace the widest possible representation of the broadest possible extent of the diverse political, tribal and communal interests with a stake in the South Sudan peace process without appearing to pander to trivial interests or encourage factionalism and fragmentation among the key players.

The study has offered valuable lessons from the IGAD intervention initiatives in South Sudan, where through a meticulous assessment of the conflict mediation dynamics, they make wide ranging recommendations which, as has been pointed out by various observers are key to the achievement of lasting peace and security in the country.

This study makes the following general recommendations on the peace process in South Sudan and the role of IGAD in the entire effort:

- The establishment of a Credible transitional justice arrangement, possibly the adoption of a hybrid court and Truth Commission ought to be considered as part and parcel of the peace process. IGAD should include this provision as one of the agenda items under implementation of the R-ARCSS.
- The resolution of the conflict, as mediated by IGAD should substantially focus on restructuring the Governance structure of the country through a comprehensive constitutional review designed to abrogate the interim constitution still in force and usher in a new constitution dispensation. Accompanying the enactment of a new constitution should be a participatory and inclusive process to review the state boundaries, possibly through a referendum organized and supervised by a neutral body.
- IGAD should meaningfully engage all the parties and stakeholders, including the small parties, personalities, politicians, dissidents and military commanders in the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
- Critical security sector reforms that have lagged in implementation and remained in abeyance should be implemented as a matter of priority. These reforms must include the establishment of a unified national, professional army and security apparatus along other vital state institutions.
- IGAD should prioritize the humanitarian crisis triggered by the war and particularly advance measures aimed at the repatriation of refugees.
- IGAD should establish and implement a credible mechanism of imposing targeted sanctions against individuals and institutions judged as hostile to the peace process or those who actively undertake measures designed to undermine or sabotage the peace process.

Involving communities ensures that indigenous resources are strategically employed to find solutions for durable peace. These resources are not limited to finances; they include indigenous knowledge of conflict resolution mechanisms and cultural practices. Thus national governments ought to promote multi-stakeholder approaches, and enhance the capacity of local communities to work together with formal and informal institutions to generate innovative solutions. Re-building social infrastructure after conflict involves the participation of all sections of society. This calls for access to information about peace building processes.

Aid workers and donors should ensure that people with disabilities have access to humanitarian services on an equal basis as those without disabilities and that discrimination does not arise as a result of failing to make adequate provision for the needs of people with disabilities in their programming and distribution of assistance. They should ensure the participation of people with disabilities and older people in the design of their programs and develop strategies and action plans that eliminate physical, communication and attitudinal barriers to inclusion.

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